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New Therapies, Old Problems, or, A
Plea for Neuromodesty
Stephen J. Morse, University of Pennsylvania
This article suggests that investigational deep brain stimulation

(DBS) for mental

disorders raises few new bioethical issues. Although the scientific basis of the procedure

may be both complex and largely unknown, addressing informed consent in such situations is a familiar problem. After reviewing the legal and moral background for
investigating DBS and the scientific difficulties DBS faces as a potential treatinent for mental disorders, the article focuses on informed consent and makes two primary
suggestions. The study of DBS may proceed, but "hyper-disclosure" of the complexities should be required for competent subjects or proper surrogates if the candidate
is not competent, and the most rigorous standard for competence sho,tld

be employed.

Throughout, neuromodesty and caution are urged.
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DBS for psychiatric disorders may be a new therapy, but the

tarian do we wish our regime to be and what meta-ethical

issues it raises, including autonomy concerns, are familiar

commitments do we wish to make, if any? All commenta

in bioethics because the same issues have been raised pre

tors appear to concede that the usual framework of benefit,

viously for other medical and psychological therapies (see
generally Morse 2004; 2009). The basic framework of benefit,

harm, and autonomy for thinking about the acceptability of
any intervention, whether it is proven or experimental, is

harm, and autonomy is no different whether one is consid

the appropriate framework. I expand those three categories

ering proven or experimental psychological, pharmacolog

to seven-efficacy, intrusiveness, side effects, potential for

ical, or physical interventions such as DBS. All interven

abuse to the subject and others, cost, distributional concerns,

tions change the brain. The issue is how. Context matters,

and autonomy-but the analysis is similar.

of course, and the hard work will be applying the general

The problem is that none of these variables is self

ethical parameters to the specific problems DBS will create.

defining with a consensual meaning . These terms are of

The ethical problems psychiatric DBS does and will pro

varying vagueness and are capable of diverse broad and

duce stem from our lack of knowledge about the relation

narrow interpretations. For example, writers have distin

between the brain and complex human behavior, from lack

guished "moral autonomy," the capacity to subject oneself

of data about the effects of DBS, and from mostly innocent

to objective moral principles, and "personal autonomy," a

overclaiming about our knowledge that may undermine

value-neutral ability of individuals to self-govern any as

attempts to proceed cautiously (Morse

pect of their existence they deem important according to

2005).

Nonetheless,

there is enormous agreement in both individual and expert

whatever goals or desires they choose or have. We might

group writings on both sides of the Atlantic about the eth

also characterize the distinction as between objective or

ical concerns and the types of restrictions that should be

virtue autonomy and subjective autonomy. Are there ob

placed on DBS.

jective moral principles, however, and how would we dis

This article addresses the important background le

cover them? Moreover, which form of autonomy one might

gal/ethical and scientific considerations. Then it turns to

privilege will depend on the strength of one's preference for

the problem of autonomy itself. Questions of harms and

individual liberty. Should the conception of autonomy we

benefits are not discussed unless they bear directly on the

adopt be a legal right, a normative ideal, or a set of basicfac

autonomy problem. The basic conclusion is that DBS should

tual capacities? The answer theoretically is all three, but as

continue under extremely strict constraints with competent

a practical matter it is a legal right and we must decide the

patients who have been exquisitely fully informed and per

contours of that right in the context of experimental DBS.

haps also with incompetent patients if there is proper sub

Let me provide an analogy from U.S. constitutional law.

stituted judgment consent.

The Supreme Court is often asked to decide what process

ETHICAl AND LEGAl BACKGROUND

ular liberty and there is no specific provision in the Consti

is due when the government seeks to infringe on a partic

The related legal and ethical questions are political and

tution to decide the question. For example, should some

metaethical: For example, how parentalistic versus liber-

one about to lose welfare benefits for violating the terms of
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receiving those benefits be entitled to a formal hearing and,

the most sophisticated current philosophy of science view

if so, what further protections should be provided at the

about explaining complex human behavior-by which I

hearing? The Supreme Court has adopted a three-part test

mean mental states (including moods) and actions-is that

for deciding such cases that balances

a multifield, multilevel approach will be necessary (Craver,

the interest at stake;

(1)

the importance of

(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation

2007). The astonishing advances in neuroscience, especially

of the interest because of the procedures used, and the prob

those fueled by the advent of functional magnetic resonance

able value of additional procedural safeguards; and

imaging

government's interest

(3) the

(Mathews v. Eldridge 1976). Although

(fMRJ), have scarcely changed our

currently mod

est understanding of the brain-mind-action connection. Fu

these are the right considerations, this balancing test has

ture advances may do so, but that is a cautiously optimistic

never been outcome determinative and is always elastic de

speculation about the future.

pending on the court's political and moral preferences.

At present, most cognitive and social neuroscience stud

The same will be true in any bioethical context. Deciding

ies on human beings, especially neuroimaging, involve very

whether and when a proven or experimental intervention
is permissible suffers from the same use of contested ethical

small numbers of subjects. Further, most studies average the
neurodata over the subjects and the average finding may

and political concepts and from indeterminacy. We some

not accurately describe the brain structure or function of

times forget this when weighing considerations pro and

any actual subject in the study. Replications are few, which

con. Focusing on the correct considerations is only the be

is especially important for law and policy. Policy should not

ginning of the moral enterprise, however. Being sensitive to

be influenced by findings that are insuffiently established,

context and practice will be crucial.

and replications of findings are crucial to our confidence in
a result.
The functional neuroscience of cognition and interper

Scientific Considerations
As Kuhn and colleagues

sonal behavior is largely in its infancy, and what is known

(2009) wrote:

is quite coarse-grained and correlational rather than fine

DBS for psychiatric patients is not a standard therapeutic
method. Therefore, every application of DBS in a psychiatric
patient somehow enters into the experimental domain and has
to be justified by a thorough, in-depth an<� lysis of benefits, risks

grained and causal (Miller

2010).

Any language that sug

gests otherwise, such as claiming that some brain region is
the neural substrate for the behavior, is simply not justifiable
in most cases. There are also technical and research design

and burdens. (5137)

difficulties that undermine valid inferences, but future ad

Just so. In this context I think we should be especially

of the difficulties of functional imaging, but the meaning

vances may remedy this. Structural findings avoid some

cautious for the most basic scientific reasons. Autonomy,

of findings is often not apparent and many of the positive

however it is understood, is preserved by the doctrine of

findings may be the result of significance bias (loannidis

informed consent. The question is what we can justifiably

2011).

tell patients as they, or surrogate decision makers, decide

is a cause, an effect, or just a correlate of the condition under

whether the subject should undergo DBS. I begin with gen

investigation.

We seldom know whether an anatomical difference

Now let me turn to some specifics regarding psychiatric

eral considerations and then turn to the specifics.
The brain-mind-action connection is one of the hardest

disorders in particular. To study such disorders. properly

problems in science. Many think, for example, that explain

presupposes that the researchers have already identified

ing consciousness, which is a crucial aspect of our subjective

and validated the diagnostic behavior under neuroscientific

experience and moral lives, may be the hardest problem

investigation. On occasion, the neuroscience might suggest

in science, and some claim that it is beyond current hu

that the behavior is not well characterized or is neurally

man capacities to solve it (McGinn

indistinguishable from other, seemingly different, behavior.

1999).

I am agnostic, but

these are indisputably difficult problems. Although there

In general, however, the existence of psychiatrically rele

has been substantial progress in understanding the neural

vant behavior will already be apparent. And if the behavior

correlates and some causes of certain types of cognition, at

and the imaging data are inconsistent, we should virtually

present we have no idea how the brain enables mental states

always believe the behavior. Actions speak louder than im

and how action is possible (McHugh and Slavney

ages.

1998). For

example, we would like to know the causal difference be

If the behavioral data are not clear, then the potential

tween a neuromuscular spasm and intentionally moving

contribution of neuroscience is large. Unfortunately, it is in

one's arm in exactly the same way, but we do not know the
difference.
Many people hope that intertheoretic reduction of psy
chological states to brain states will help to solve the prob

just such cases that the neuroscience at present is not likely

to be of much help. I term this the ''clear cut" problem
(Morse

2011).

Neuroscientific studies start with clear cases

of well-characterized behavior, so the neural markers might

lem, but the intertheoretic reduction program has failed to

be quite sensitive to the already clearly identified behaviors

explain mental states and social life. We cannot even ac

precisely because the behavior is clear. Less clear behavior is

complish the allegedly simplest reduction from chemistry

simply not studied, or the overlap in findings for less clear

to physics, and there is theoretical reason to believe that

behavior is greater between experimental and control sub

the reductionist program cannot succeed. In my opinion,

jects. For example, investigators have discovered various
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small but statistically significant differences in neural struc

of DBS are more problematic than one would suspect from

ture and function between people who are clearly suffering

reading the seemingly cautious literature.

from schizophrenia and those who are not. Nonetheless, in

We do not need scientific understanding of why some

a behaviorally unclear case, the overlap between data on

intervention relieves human suffering. If we discover empir

the brains of people with and without the disorder is so

ically that something works, then we may be well justified

great that no imaging finding is yet sufficiently sensitive to

in offering it, assuming that we reasonably understand the

be used for psychiatric diagnosis (Frances

potential short and long-term harms. We do not have the

2009).

To the extent that neural correlates for mental disorders
have been identified, they tend to be nonspecific. That is,

database yet for the efficacy and harms of psychiatric DBS,
but it is possible that we may in the future.

findings in similar regions of the brain have been identified
with mental disorders as diverse as major affective disor
ders and schizophrenia. In the context of psychiatric DBS,

INFORMED CONSENT FOR PSYCHIATRIC DBS

a U.S. consensus conference concluded that "no single tar

The foregoing discussion suggests that obtaining informed

get has been validated or demonstrated to be superior to

consent to psychiatric DBS is exceptionally problematic.

others in any disorder of MBT" [mood, behavior, thought]
(Rabins et a!. 2009,

932). Further, it is virtually impossible to

Even the most careful investigator is eager to learn more
about the brain-mind-action connection, and all investiga

do the type of randomized, controlled, blinded studies that

tors would like to alleviate suffering. Thus, for even the most

are typically the gold standard. Finally, the types of patients

cautious investigator, it will be difficult not to overstate how

who will agree to investigational psychiatric DBS will vir

much we know and how justifiably we can hypothesize.

tually certainly not be a random sample, even of intractable
patients.

Informed consent, the guarantor of autonomy, raises es
sentially two issues: who can provide it, and what must be

Some people think that animal translational models will

provided to the patient or subject? To grant an investiga

offer solutions to some of the neuroscientific problems that

tor permission to violate the subject's otherwise inviolable

hinder achieving the goals of psychiatric therapies, but we

right to be left alone, in U.S. law the waiver must be know

should not reach this conclusion too hastily. When we are

ing and intelligent, and it must be voluntary (Berg et a!.

dealing with essentially mechanistic phenomena, such as

2001).

the movement signs of movement disorders, animal models

ber of factors, including the subject's intelligence and ratio

may be of great help because we are dealing with pure mech

nal capacities generally; the difficulty of the decision to be

W hether a waiver is competent depends on a num

anisms. Unless the reductionist program succeeds, however,

made, and the test for competence that will be applied. In

we cannot treat mental disorders, even the most severe,

the United States, three general legal tests have been iden

seemingly culturally impenetrable, disorders, as pure mech

tified for an adequate informed consent: factual feedback,

anisms. They are part of psychological experience, which

appreciation, and rational manipulation. Factual feedback

includes mental states and actions, and are aspects of whole

is satisfied if the subject can accurately repeat what he or she

people who are makers of and interpreters of meaning, who

has been told. Appreciation refers to the subject's ability to

reflect on their own lives, and who are always shaped by in

understand how the intervention applies in his or her case.

terpersonal and social variables. Other animals do not have

Rational manipulation asks whether the subject can engage

these capacities or do not have them to the same degree. l

in a reasonable benefit-cost calculus about the intervention.

would argue that these differences often prevent adequate

Holding capacity and task difficulty constant, the outcome

translation, even when the outward behavior of another

might be different depending on the test.

animal--€.g., a grieving chimp-seems so familiar to us.
Over time, however, these problems may ease as imag

The issue of capacity is both factual and normative.
W hat is the subject capable of doing and what should be

ing and other techniques become less expensive and more

required for exercising informed consent? A currently un

accurate, as research designs become more sophisticated,

resolvable difficulty, however, is determining what a sub

and as the sophistication of the science increases generally.

ject is capable of doing. For example, we cannot distinguish

There is also an open question of whether accurate infer

people who can govern themselves properly from people

ences or predictions about individuals are possible using

who simply are not motivated to do so. At most, generally,

group data for a group that includes the individual. This

we make inferences from the subject's general behavior and

is a very controversial topic, but even if it is difficult or

from how well the subject seems to react to the decision at

impossible now, it may become easier in the future.

hand. We know from experimental work that people with

In short, at present we must admit that we do not under

depression, a prime psychiatric indicator for DBS, appear to

stand the neural causes of major mental disorders or how

be able to "pass" operationalized measures of the three ma

DBS works when it seems to do so. Talk of "neuromodu

jor U.S. tests for competence to consent to treatment (Berg

1996; Grisso and Appelbaum 1995).

lation" as an explanation of its efficacy means nothing or

et a!.

very little because it is a conclusory, vague description, not

perimental DBS, the knowledge base is so thin that there

In the case of ex

a genuine explanation. The upshot of these considerations

is a strong argument that decision makers should choose

is that interventions based on justified hypotheses about

the most demanding test, but note that choosing the most

which target to choose or about virtually any other aspect

demanding increases the level of paternalism.
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The prime danger for potential DBS candidates may be
potentially poor exercise of the capacity the subject may
have. If DBS should be reserved for intractable conditions
that have failed to respond to all other, less invasive thera
pies, then the subject may be "overly" motivated to engage
in DBS. A related concern is that DBS candidates may be es
pecially vulnerable to the "therapeutic misconception," the
incorrect understanding that this experimental procedure
will in fact ameliorate the subject's suffering. Investigators
must be especially vigilant about these concerns.
DBS raises the possibility of personality change. The im
plications of personal transformation over time is a familiar
problem (Parfit 1984), but, once again, context matters. As
experience with DBS for Parkinson's disease has indicated,
profound behavioral changes can accompany sudden, me
chanically produced improvement in previously debilitat
ing conditions (Haarh et a!., 20 10; Mayberg and Lozano,
2002). Despite the dramatic improvement, patients often
are less than pleased, however, because such changes make
reintegration in sociofamilial and professional life difficult
(Agid et a!. 2006). But even this context is somewhat familiar.
People often voluntarily expose themselves to experiences
that can transform them and their lives suddenly and me
chanically, such as having open heart surgery and surgery
for epilepsy. Whether and how often radical personality
shifts of sO-called "narrative personality" or identity will
occur are open questions, and if they do, DBS may not be
directly accountable.
Assuming such reintegrative or identity problems will
occur with psychiatric DBS, as long as the subject is in
formed about the possibility and the transformed subject
retains rational capacities, the potential for transformation
should not be a bar to consent. Moreover, in the future we
may be able to identify which patients are likely to experi
ence such disruptions from psychiatric DBS and we may be
able to mitigate the problems through targeted counseling
(Schectman, 2010).
The possibility that the intervention will disable the per
son and undermine future autonomy does not seem high,
but it is a potential outcome of many neurosurgical proce
dures and it is best handled by utterly full disclosure. For
example, DBS for Parkinson's disease causes some patients
to lose their energy and ambition. Full disclosure of such
risks for psychiatric DBS is once again hampered by our
limited database, but this, too, can be fully disclosed, and
experience with Parkinson's disease does not suggest that
frequent, massive disabilities should be expected.
My preferred solution for competent subjects is "hyper
disclosure." I have a strong normative preference for permit
ting people to make unencumbered decision about how to
govern their own lives and generally set the competence bar
rather low. But subjects must be absolutely fully informed
in this context in which we know so little. The complexity
of the intervention, the expectations of the subject and sig
nificant others, the particulars of the operation, and all the
other issues must be completely discussed and any potential
subject on the margin of consent should be discouraged.

January-March, Volume 3, Number 1, 2012

What if the potential subject is not competent to provide
informed consent according to the governing competence
standards, thus raising a genuine autonomy problem? One
possibility is to bar DBS absolutely, but this may prevent
obtaining knowledge in circumstances in which we might
most need it and it may condemn the subject to needless suf
fering. Despite our lack of understanding of the mechanism
of change, DBS does seem to alleviate psychiatric suffering
in a nontrivial number of cases, which is why experimenta
tion continues.
Assuming that incompetence is not an absolute bar, who
should decide, and should we use a subjective or objective
standard for substituted judgment? Again, these are famil
iar problems. Family members are usually best placed to
make such decisions, but there can be an inevitable conflict
of interest. If we are reasonably certain that the substitute de
cision maker is genuinely attempting to act in the subject's
best interest, should the decision maker try to determine
what the subject would have wanted to do or use a more
objective, reasonable person standard? In this instance, it is
hard to know what outcome either standard would produce
because the procedure is so experimental. Advance medical
directives are unlikely to clearly cover such situations. I have
a general preference for subjective standards because I pre
fer maximizing self-governance, but I have no strong view
in this context. The difficulty of exercising substituted judg
ment by any standard suggests that incompetence should
perhaps be an absolute bar, but I do not want to reach this
conclusion yet. The possibility of substituted judgment in
this context requires the most careful attention.

CONCLUSION

In sum, my proposal is for neuromodesty and all that this
entails. The ethical questions are familiar and little differ
ent from those raised by any experimental procedure about
which the knowledge and hypothesis base is so slim. As
more data accumulate, however, the ethical issues specific
to DBS will emerge more clearly.
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